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Ttre aims of tiris preambLe are to introduce the essential features of recombl-
nant DIIA work in the general backpound of riroderzr developnents in biotechnolo-
igr and to present the considerations wtrlch have Led. the Connoission to prepare
the project of a directive aomp€lli.ng the lvlenber $tates to adopt gcreral- pre-
olutlons against hazards possibly aesociated to certain. fo::ms of recornbjnan'b
Dl,lA workr
rygri$&I3-glA 
-srrrq a4d *Lf e-q!ru*:grJg3*q. $
Moderrr technicJues and. rnost part5.ctr1ar3.y the use of recently discovered ena;rrnest
e,.r1led res'triction enuJroles, now a.llow the arrangenent of genetic material in
combina'tions nhich at the noment d"o not r:xist und.er naturaL conditions. fite
general method. involves the isolation of DI{A fron a donor organisn, its frag-
mentation by restriction enzJrmea into groups of one or more genesr the ccnpling
of selecteil fragments to a vector (usually a vinrs or a consti.tuent of the
cell" to be used a-s host) and its introductj.on in a host-cell which may'
be propagated to forrn populations of identic*l cells calIed cloneg.
Provided that the genetic material transferred. in this nanner repLicabes and
expresses itself in its new surroundin6ts, there are theoretical.ly no limits
to the renge of organissls lrith ne$r properties rnrhich may be produced. through
the ure af recombinant Dl{A technologr. Ln practice, however, the cLoning and
expression of foreign D$A into rride).y unrelated host-organisins are extreme\r
tlifl'j"cult to achieve and.r in sone cpsses, probab\r impossible' Yet, IilIA, scguences
codin6 for human placental Lactogen antl hunan growtlr bormone have been cloned
rn the 'bacteria 4gche{i-cblg coli (a natural resident of the hurnan d.iges'bive
tract) and. in at lea.st two instances (e4pression in E. coli of a chenically
e,ynthotizeC gene farbhe horoone somatostatin and of the yeast structural
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gene for the enz'nne inidazole-glycerophospha*e dehydratase) has it been shown
that the erpression problen could be overcome.
It is obvious, in view of these prospects and of these results, that recorobi-
nant lgrlA technologr opens up new avemes for f\rndanental and. applied work
which uill certainly lead. to an enorrnous improvernent in our iarowledge of
;lenetic strrrctures and genetic fbnctions and which, in the Long :tnt souLd
completelg revolutionize certain production methods in agriculture artd indus-
try. I.lhile growth hormone aild jnsulin represent well }rrow exanples of products
uhich couJ.d be elaborated at industrial level" by nanipnlated bacteriar several
other substarc€s (calcitonin, prolactinl neurotransmitters, antibod'ies ...)
may also be produced. in the sarae manner by the pharmaceuticaL jndustries. In
the medical solences, one may conceive that the repairlng of genetio d.efecte
in man will one day become feasj.ble,with the help of reconbinant DIA work.
!n agrianlture, through appropriate genetio transfers in isoLated protoplasts
regenerated aftemard.s into entire plants, rnod.ified crop species could be
obtained ulrich wsuLd. conbine the characterlstics of unrel,ated species and.
present novel properties with regatd to nitro6en uptaker d.ieease resistance
and a wide range of d.ifferent 6ra3.ity factors. $rch progregses ale not yet
in sight but are lrithin our reacb as long tern objectives. Corrntries with
modern technologiee, such as the USA and. Japa.n, have fully realized, the lmpor-
tance of regeareh in this area and in all reLated fieLds of applied. noLecular
biologr,
Ricks i^lrsociated to recombinarrt HfA uork
}lhile it is d"ifficul.t to predic1; vhat a competent nicrobiolog:ist couLd achieve
if he undertook to improve s;n:tcrnatically, througlr genetic manipulati.ons, the
virrlenee of importa:it pLant pathogens or r,c incorporate in E. coli the nNA
fron highly pathogenic orgamisms U.ke lacillus anthracis or Clostridiurn
botulinu"ur, it appears that, except for such deliberate attaapts to endanger
man;urri tris environment, the risk a^ssocierbeil. to recombinant DNA work ig at the
moment conjectura} andt to a very large extent, controllable.
- 
Con.lectu"*1_$lgg ql the ::;gociatcd risks
{here is, in theory, a risk that living
organisns residing in man or in specles
orgy:.nisms r arrd partieular\r nicro-
i*portant to raan, acg*.ire upon
./.
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receipt of foreign DNA properties which lendor them dangerous and' harmf\rll"
6s a, matter of fact, any tranefer of genetic information rrhich confers sirmrl-
taneous\r to the host-organism a selective advantage and a mod'ification of
characters $riIl to eome extent affect our envirc'nment. The effects may be
almost negligibl€ or beneficiaL if the new characters are near\y neutral or
useflil to nanl they roay be devaetating, either at short or long terrnt j'f
they promote neg factors (pathogenlci'by, incluction or propagation of callcerst
modification of environnental equilibrlun, nrptrrre of food. chains '..) which
man and the surround"ings he bae d.omesticated are rrnable to tolerate.
In practice, houever, this risk has not yet been rrerified. On the contrary,
most of the erperimerrts a,:rd. model scenarioe (see for instance CUR'llS$ R'
.lmr. Rev. MicrobioL. 30 : 50?*533, 19?5 and report of the U.S. - 11'lB0 I'lor"i<*
ehop held in Ascotn &ngiancl, January 2'l-29, 19?B) constni.cterl for assessment
pulpo6es do poi,nt out that organisns hearing recombiriant Itl{A are perhaps
unliko\y, for variourr reasons deali.ng wi.th the low adaptivo fitnese of
manipulated celLs and the general requirements for transcrtption and' infec-
tion, to generate biohazard.s greater ihan those a^ssociateti to eonventional
research ri.th pathog€rltsr In add.ition, it may be suggested. fron the fact
that ttre reproductive barriora $.rd iso}ating mechanisms operating in nature
are error-grone and overlapping that tirere is perha.ps no such thingr rrncler
natural. condi.tions, as an absolute trarrler to gene excharrge between an;r trto
organisms* Thence nanr and hie environnent, sfutce they survived the conti-
nuous f}ow of genetic information be*nee.ri speciesr ma,Jl possibly'be conside-
red as relatively tolerant to aray nerr fomr of, recombinant *1$4.
- 
Possibilities for control
Partic-ularly becarrse the ecientists enga,ged, in recombinant DNA wori'" uere
the first to point out (as:.Lomar Conferencer 19?3) the dangers possibly
associated to their activities, research in this area ha"s continuousl.y been
connected. to the development of containment tLevices and of monitoring
eystemsn As a reeul"t of this, nethcds, cri"ppl.ed. host strains and faeiliti.es
have beerr created. which grea*ly re,iuee the chance that an orgarrism hearing
recombinant ID'IA escapea the laborarory (physicai contairurent) or snrviveg
to contlitions prevailin6 outside the lairoratory' {liotogical- contai.runen*).
./.
hlhiLe the forms of containment avaiLabLe'
to bioIogicaL containment, certainLy need
they aIready provide' when used correctLy,
the risk that man and his environment are
and particutarLy those pertalnlng
to be improved and soPhisticated,
a very strong Protection against
contaminated bY recombinant DNA'
eu:gat_f nei, and natjoia
The development of recombinant DNA techniques has caused intense pubLic and
scientjfic debate in many countries which jnvolved such issue as the defini-
tion of the fieLd covered by recombinant DNA work, the cLassification of this
work in categories of risks and in levets of containment, the necessity for
state controt, the type of control (vo[untary or statutory) to be invoLved
and the protectjon of inteLIectuat property.
In the USA, the NationaI Institute of HeaLth (NIH) reLeased very deta'ited
guidel..ines provid'ing an accurate cLassificatjon of research activities in
categories of risks and of assigned containment tevets. At the moment onLy
the Laboratories sponsored by the NIH are compet[ed to foLiou these guidet'ines
which are presentty under revision and wiLl probabLy be made Less stringent-
Guidelines someuhat simiLar to those of the NIH have been prepared or are in
preparation, outside the Community, in aLt countries with advanced technoLo-
gies but, as yet, no computsory order have been issued on the matter in these
countries.
!,,ith'in the European Comrnunity, the United K'ingdom has rendered compuLsory
advance notification of genetic manipu[aticir work by aLL those who intend to
carry out such work on the nationaL territory" A code of practice,, uhi'ch
differs from thai of the NIH on essentiaL points deaLing h,ith cLassificat'ion
procedures and containment methods, is at the moment opereted under a votun-
tary basis but uith the understanding that the inspectors of the HeaLth and
Safety executive have extensive po!{ers to enforce duties as weLL as pre-
caut'ions recommended by the British Advisory Group, The other Flember
States have also prepared or adopted guideLines to nesearch uith recombinant
DNA which in some cases adhere to either the British or the American system
and'in others represent a comprornise between the two sets of guidetines.
.1.
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In France, ttlne lletherlarids, D*nmark and Belgium, the Natisnal Advi'sory
Comrnittees ha$e been asstrgnec. tha task to regi.ster the work at hand and to review
resoarch proposals. While a declara'tion of agreenent has been d.ri*fted' in
France under which goverlunenta.l, acadenic and indu^gtrial l"aboratories
$i11 submit to revies and approvaL any'project for racombinant INA work, only
1wo l,ienber $tates ( ':he Fecleral Republic of Germany and. The l{etherlands)
have, j"n addition to tlre l.hited. Kingd.our, cloarly ind.icated. e.n inten*ion
to introd.uce regulations on recombinant DI'IA reeearchn Ln the Federal
Republic of Gernnarly, the carnpulsory orders will first be reetrictea to
research financad by national frurdsl at a Ls,ter etagor they wii"l be extended
to actlvities supported by the ilI#nrlerrr and. tty private Eources.
The elaboration or adop"bion of guid.eiines in the Member States avrd in other
European countries has been greatly facilitated W the critj-cal. revietm and
rocommendstions which were iseued by the ad.-hoo co;runitte€ on reoomblnanrt DNA
resea.rch of the Er.l.ropean Science Fowrdation and by the Standing Comnit"bee
of 8.M,8.0. oil reconbinant DNAr
ry e g es at lL,-{.olge}i g!@ otr*$ gpgpg}ty g3"qr} 4ar*g
ft is the view of the Comniesion that etx d.i.fferent sets of consid.erations
etrongly underline the necessity for national lawg on the natter :
Hersgsx-lsjsss t{se:-g!*lsg
ilthough it is not d,esirahle, in viow of the d.ifferences between the variors
containrnen'b faailities available in Furope, that identical gtr*"delines are
adopted and followed by all l'ternber States, it is nevertheless essential,
to avoid la.rge variations in research potentia,l,.i'biesr that cerhain basic
"/.
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principles of safety are acc*pted and adhered i;o by the Gammwrity of
Ilenber states. ,Ihe present situation in which some llernber $tates have
ad.opted. legislation on recombinant Dl{A woyk or are p}'an:ning to da so while
othe:'e ]ravenrt as yet defined. arqr fo:nral poLicy on the matter is, in this
respec*, unaoeeptable tc the eyes of the Cornnission becalee it wilI lead to
the development of differlng coneLitions of safety, *rork anrd success bet?teen
],Iember States and, subsequently, to the concentration of research activities
at the most permissive sites, $uch an expar:,sion of divergences will not
arise if national legisS.ations, harnonized in part aror:nd. a oore of Comunity
princip!.es, are ad.opted in each Member State and. provide the necessaJlr tools
for the pennanent implementation of safety measures coraparable in egsence
throughout the entire Corunrnityr
$S.-9I91gl$y-:a,Uei{ reei." 1-'t iqfr-on-I-ecgnEin:g!-ry4-!9"tr9199
Genetic rnanipulations only form a small part of the attempts which nan is
now making for assuming the responsibility for llfe on this planet and for
trarrsforning his approach to tbe d.onestication of Lower forms. Several ner'r
methoda have now been devoloped. r*hich a1low the imobilization on carriers,
for induetrial use, of enzgmes ancl of cel]s, *he prodr.ction of new s3mthetic
compounds, the nass-production of proteins in fernentatiorr batches andr in
a general &anner, a conpLete mod.ification of the rel"ationship between nnan
and nature. In the 3-ong tern, the applications of molesu.Lar biolory to
agriculture and !.ndustry will unavoidah\y transform life in society and. wilL
induce significant and, possib\i, irreversible changes to our errvironmen*.
To :'equest that the techniques which are to bri,lg i;hese ciranges are subjec-
ted, fron the start, to statutory control a:rri to lcgS.slatic,n does no-L corrs-
titute an eggression to progress but, on the contrary, a recoEgrition of the
need to adapt society to ner.r scj.entific developrnents.
Recombj.nant nIA r+ork, even though the risk it represents is conjectural,
well analysed. i.n the Member States and. possib$r not greater than the dangers
associated. tc conventional research with pathag{:rrri, eonstitu.tes, in this
connexi':n, a choice material fcr estabLishing compatibiLitie: between Iegis-
tation and the deveLopmenr,:f modern technologies and for preparing a first
basj's to the disposiiions r;hich roill undoubtedly hav'e 'io be taken ir: the
future to protect r:ran again,st his ow:: achj.evenents" Frovid.ed. tlrat the
legislaiion arl"opted is tolerant, flexible, a,nd assceiated. to a rtj"uulation
of rcscareh through. funcling, the opportwri+"S strauld. not be nisr.:ed.*
./.
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The classification of a risk as cnnjectsra[ does not imply than the rink
under consideration is benign; lCh'ite scenarios reF,resenting the pLanet
cotonf:ecl by a rieH ctass of organisms combjninE the requirements and
features of bacteria arid marnmaL's are of course punely f i o'tii iqrus the expansion
af myxoma'tosis in Europe or the destructiqrn sf a tobacco fieLci by bl"ack
shank ittustrate the gravity of the darqers uhictr may he associaterJ te the
sudden spread of microorganisns r*ith prop*rties adapted to the'ir environ-
ment" It isn as a matter of fact, in prevision of such conjectura[ dangers
that various forms of physiceL ccntainment and certified strains of bacteria
unabLe to survive outside Iaboratsry cond'itions are l.rejng produced through-
out the hlestern wor{"d. If the gravity of the risk invoLved is such as to
require the etaboratlon of these 
€i(pensive protection devices it certa.inlyjustlf'les the preparation of orders lntendesJ to insure that they effecti-
vel'y servo their purpcse and are used to protect against the risk which
they are srpposed to contain.
- 
p4panstqr of, reconblnarrt Dlil, rprk
soientiflc progreBs in the fietd, ie occrlring eo rapid.ly that a number of
experimente involving the produotion and. use of recombinant IffA ca' nou be
executed' nn a rotrtine basie and cona*i.tute clsssical approaches to cer*ain
investlp5ations in raolectrlsr gpneil"cs* Htrat appeerred, to be, a few years
agpt a very sophisticated tecturiqr-le acceeeibLe to a small nurnber of hiebly
apeclalized lnetltutes is betng commCIr\y ueed., in margr labcrator.ies, for
apeci$inB genes a$d' thei.r producto. In a.d.cL{tionr geveral centerrs devoted"
to applied' researchr and anong them nargi La,boratories operated by private
industrlea, have bceome auaJne of *he pc'-be:itialities of recorbinant DttA
techniques for ganetic eagineerin6 purposes and. have launched", or are
contemplating ta Lannch, lmporf'ant rosearch actions cen.tred upon the p;ro,iuc-
tion and use of recornbina$t rffa. ftrug the rlsk, i.f .there te one, whi.ch ie
a'ssocts'*nd' *o rec*nbi.nsfft W*" ie fn*in*aeirig wi*tr ti.me ir: prcp*r*ion vlth
the total nuntr*r *f x$,tes wh€r+; s{rcii *orh re ca*ied o*t*
*gl ;. i?Je'&,
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Transnatlonal nature of the risk
The faet that the biological.naterial. subjected to recombinant DlfA rEork
uoually lncludee vlnrseE a^nd bacterla rhich, assuming their escape fron
the laboratoly, are not subjocted to the bamier of national. borders reduces
to a csrtain ertent the Liberty of tndivl&raL nations to rlefine and to follow
independent policles ln the flel.'iL of gearetlc nani1nr.latlons. Agreement must
be reached rithin comunitles of nelgfrbouring countries on the geneeal
objoctlvea and ecale of the prote<rtion e;rrteme drich are to be established'
anit guarerrteee nust be given to the reapect of theee agree,nente" $rch
rage@ants and. auch gu*ra,nte€s can best be generated through lege1 d.ispoei-
tlcno, taken ln each oount4yj rhlch are bssed. uposr e core of prlncipLes
adopted. ll oomonr
Reeearghjln lpboralggkg_froglglvatq. q,terllgeg
l{trtle tt 1g possible to cmcel,v€p ir the abseunce of national Leg'isl.etions
reguletlng rork rltb reconbinant Dl{A, that tbe governnental funding agencies
naintatn e csrtaln level of controL over. tho research a.ctivities of univer-
sities and nstimral lnetltut€dr lt is fernore difficuLt to envisage, in the
abs€mce of legal" d.lepoaitlons, a syet**n compeLling *he J.aboratories fron
private lnduetries to adhere to the tersrs of national guiclelines on reoombi-
nant IX{Ar tlhere 14, tn othor uorde, in a corrntry wbere eu*h guide}inee are
folloneil on a vol.untary ba.eie, a risk that different J.aboratories working
at ldentical levele of, riska d.o not *bsefi/e the es,ma rules to safeguards
a^nd, to conteirunentr Hhereas it le obvlfite that a eituation of thie type is
unacceptab}c it is alao eqrai.\r o'bvious n :"n v:i.ew of the irnportance of
recombinant il{A techno}ogr fsr the pronotia* of f,\:ropean bi.o-induetri.es,
that e J.og:5.sl.et1on on r*ecnbinsv-rt INA nork mrst not end.anger i-ntel-l"ectual
property rig[*n snd th*"r' :xpecia.L attwpte rri]-3 h*ve to be mac-a bv tbe
legteXator tc restrisi +,.,n *rLn*smm tha itlEclosu?s hr ind*et:.i.ia$ {"i: *r.r:fi-
dential goi.*$*ift n infbr:re.t J-snr
'/.
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&,:lggsgttjlv tlj tect i.vg cn . recombi&Art .,?$.&-ilorL
The problems ratsed by Eenetic manipulatiens and the possible need for a
Community directive sompeILinG, each t4ember State to adopt certain measures
of protecti6n and of controI agairrst eonjectr.lra( nisks have tieeri disctrssed
severaI tinres by the Committse sn l4edicaI arrd Puh:tic HeaLth Research (C"R"M,)
and by ad lroc expert groups in the presence of, representativ*s t:'l E"S.F"
and El{80"
FoL[owing this period of consuLtationn the Commissicn prepared the attached
project for a Cr:uncit directive regut.atlng work on recombinant DNA. This
pro ject takes simr:ttaneousty into acc,runt the RLices$ary requi rements f or
safety and the need fcr ftexibi|'ity and adaptation to tocaI eircumstat'tces,
ldhite stipuIating that recomtrinant Dl'{A considered to be associated to con-
jectur;:t hazards cannot be perforrned if it is not first registered and autho-
rized by the Nationat Authorityu the pnoposed directive Learres entire Liber-
ty to this htational Authority'in each F'lember State to establish the catego-
rization and containment Ievets which it cieems most appropriate" SperciaL
provision is taken for work tabulated as [otr risk and attempts are made tcr
reduce at a minimum the amount of scientific fnformat'iorr which is to be
discLc,sed for r"egistration and aLrthsrizati$h purposes" FinaLlyr'fut.L refe-
rence is made in the text of the directive to the fact that the tenms of the
present crders wiIL have ts br" revieued regutarLy at short intervals and
revised, vhen necessary, at thE tiEht of ner devetopments and sc'ientifjc
progresses. In ad.d.ltionr tho Cornmtseion rEi.ll n*u{y the epoclal casg,
oovered' at the nonen* by the tarns of the prollmt d.lreetive, whioh $ono€rncr
ttrs uas of rcaombinen'b XSA meterial fsr ).*rge soals inqb*otrf*l prodr.r"ct5.ur:ri
if nsess*ary adellt:!.onaL d'lrs*tiras sdapt*d *o euoh easel roi.Ltr be prop,oseC
by' tho fiomriselou*
0riginat : EngLish
COiIJECTURAL HAZARDS OF RECOIiIBINANT DNA t,lORK
Counci L Directive
The CounciI of the European Communities,
Havlng regard to the Treaty estabLishinE the European Economic Comnunity, and
in partlcutar ArticLc 235 thereof,
Having regard to thc proposaI fron the Connoissiont
Having regard to the opinion of the European Partiament,
tlhereas Articte ? of the Treaty assigns to the Commission the task, among
others" to promote throughout the Community a harmonious devetopment of econo-
mic activftles, a continuous and batanced expansion and an increase in stabi-
Llty ;
l{hereas the development of basic and appIied bioiogicaL research is of a k'ind
to contribute with efficiency towards the achlevement of these objectives ;
l,lhereas this development impLies, in severat sectors, that recombinant DNA
rork be parform*d on certa'in orEanisms ;
lJhereas rccombinant DlrlA 6sr!, porformed on certain orEanims, and particuLarIy
on migpsorganisms resident il man" or Jn certa'in animal and ptant species used
'ln agricuIture, $ar* presenI c{rrlJecturat hazards to fn":n" to his foocj i-..esol:r',;es
and to hls environn+nt {ii gen€rat ;
lb
l,ihereas
ouch conjeatural
Dl{A work;
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mea,sures of protection eettled. by the authorj.ties against
hazard.s must be combined with tlre clevelopment of recombiuerrrt
1,1hereas th'is deveLopment invoIves epidemioLog'icaI and hence jnternationaL
conjecturaL haaards ;
l.jhereas the disparities bet*reen the provision,s i-n force or in Frepa-
ration in the <lj-fferen.t Member States fcr establi.shing measures of protec'tion
agailo',, the conjcctural" harards of recomhinant $IA work may g"ive rise to
differing cond.itions of safety, work and. success affecting directly the
scientific and technologi.cal competitivemess of the laboratoriee concerned irt
the Menber Statesl
tJhereas ;rction by the Corununity in the nratt'er is tnerefore
nocessary to the real.ization of the objectives of the trreaty;
'tthereas it is necessary to take into account tlre compLexity of the probIem
posecl by the conjecturaI hazards of certain types of recombinant DNA work,
the rap'id evolution in the understanding of this probLem, the extent of the
research sector concerned and the importance that must be attached to the con-
s'ideration of LocaL circumstances when assessing the hazards invoLved in per-
form'ing scienti f ic uork ;
tr|hereas protocoLs are prepared for experiments in recornbinant DNA work and it
'is necessary to minim'ize the dissemination of the substance of those protocoLs
and research projects based on the production and use of recombinant DNA in
order to safegurard scientific and industriaL secrecy and to protect intelIec-
tuaL property ;
lilhereas the Treaty has noi provirted ths necessary powers for this purpose;
x,ts 3lopP, mIIs lsnctrr4, I
Article I
l.l. This directive concerns the conjectural. haaards associated. with recombinanb
IlllA work.
/Ll
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1.2 Far the purpCIse of this directiven the fot Lo''u'inE terms have the nrean'ing
herebY essigned to them :
a) Recenrb.inant DNA uork : the fOrraation cf neu cornbinations of heritable
rnareri aL by the insertion of nucLetc acid moLecutes producedr by uhateveF
means, outside the celL' into any virus, bacteriat p|asmid or other
vector system so as to a[Lou their incorporation into a host organism in
which they do not naturally occur but in uhich they are capabLe of con-
tinued Propagation.
b) Recombinant DNA materiats : the product of recombinant DNA uork consis-
ting of organisms, inctuding v'iruses and viroids, containing recornb'inant
DNA molecules.
c) Laboratory : the site where one or more persons are engaged or ptanning
to become engaged in recombinant DNA uork and/or uhere one or more per-
sons have introduced or are ptanning to introduce reconbinant DNA
materiats.
Articl.e 2
1 Each l{ember State shal1 take appropriate steps to ensure that no activities
invoLving recombinant Dt{A work or the acguisition and. use of recomhinant
Dl{A rnaterials nay be perforued on its territory without prior notification
to the appropriate national altborities and, except for activities falling
in categories of low risk, without prior authorizsti*n fron these authori-
ties.
2 To this effeci, each [lember State eha1l subdj"vitle irn classes, according to
their nature and the conjeclural hazards tbat they i:avolve, the rrarioue
types of recombinant H,{A work.
Th'is distribution in cLasses shaLt be based upon the
source ancl degree of puri.ty of the $l{A mo}ecrrle, tbe -tector-hoi;t systern
ut:iized and the :nanipul"ative procedures proposed. The classes of recom-
binant iHA uark thus establi,shed shall tir'xi be grauped into categori.es
d.efined on the basie of *he partic.ular safety and *upervi,sor;r $sasu.*t
that rsugt be adop*eC in *rd-er to prevent marr or bis env:ronne:at fron
in<*;:ring arqr hazard th*t the $snber State may d"e,*; ,lscessive. ?hq: r;tf*ty"
arid' :upervisory l*ea.sxriies i;.-esigned tr: the vari*uri cla,sses of recombinarrl
ni{A ;tork shall. inc}ude tbe impterneniatirrn of eoqnd laboratory practice
14.- 'f '
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(if necessary through proper training of
and teehnicians) and the usa of pllysical'
ment.
safety officersr reaearch workers
and. biological. neans of contairc-
Notification of the intenti.on to rmd.ertake reoombinant !'I{A work or to
acquire recombinant D{A ma*erials shall be lodgeil by the requesti.lxg labo-
ratory with the nati.onaL authority. The notlfication shalL be accompanied
bJ:
- 
the portion of tbe experimentaL protocol whieh is reqaired fo:: the
evaluation of safety at the site where the proposed activities are to
be cagied out and., in the case of the acqui-si.tion of reconbinant Dl{A
materlals, by the deoaription of tbeee materiaLs and of shipping condi-
tione;
- 
thc List of, *he protective and supeprisollr mea.sures to be appLied"
througlrout the duration of the experimentaL work and during stora6et
propagation and hand.l.ing of recombinant DSA naterials;
- 
the d.oocription of the generaL education in recombiuant Ih[A research and
of the trainj.:ng received by the membere of the etaff r^tho will participate
to the proposed. activities or wiLl be reopoeslble for supervisionr moni-
toring or safety.
4 fhe nationaL authority ehall assess or have asseseed, accord.ing to the
criteria it d.eems rnost suitable, the conjectural harards associated to the
proposed. activities. It nay require from the applicant
flrrther inforrnaticn for the evaluation of conjectural risks and. safety
cond.itions arid-, wherever such investigation seerns necessaqrr it siraIl
make n iletail.ed. on-site exarnfunation of the cond.itions of protection and.
eafeguards.
Alticle 3
Oo the basis of the information avaiLabLe, the national alrthority shaLL
take one of the following d.ecisions :
to authorize the proposed. activities under the conditi.ons d.escribed by
the applicant;
./"
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- to authorize the proposed activjties on certain conditions;
- to prohibit the proposed activities.
The decision of the nationaL authority shaLl" be notified in writing to
the laboratory csncerned xithin a period not exceeding ninety days from
the date of receipt of the originat appIjcation for authorization-
The nationat authority shalt ensure, by the methods. it deems most effec-
tive and appropriate, that only the activities that it has authorized are
carried out on the nationaI territory. The nationaI authority sha[[ ensure
that the protective and supervisory measures referred to i;1 Articte 2(3),
second inden! and the conditions referred to in .Articte : (f)t second ind'entn
are strictty adhered to. Men$er States shaLt provide for appropriate
sanctions against any breach of these rutes-
The nationat authority has the porder to revoke any authorization it has
given.
if the Member State amends the definition of any of the categories of
recombinant DNA uork requ'iring speciat safety measures, or if these
measures are amended, the nationaL authority shalL ensure that any neu
requirement shaIt be immediatety fuLfiLLed by the Laboratories in posses-
sion of recombinant DNA materiats or performing recombinant DNA work on
the nationat territory. The nationat authority shaIL revoke any authori-
zation tlhjch does not comply nith the neu requirement and, in this case,
shalI order the suspension of activities in hand; resumption of these
activities shaLI be conditionat upon the issue of a neu authorization uhich
may be estabIished onty after exanination of the protective and supervi-
sory measures adopted by the Laboratory concerned.
Artic[e 4
Menber States shatt bring into force the provisions needed in order to
compLy with this directive uithin on€ year of its notification. They
shatt forthwith inform the Commission of the European Comnunities thereof,
'''rI
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2 l,.lembEr s'bates shalL enau?e that the text of the mea"sures which they a'd-ctpt
in the fieLel covered by thie Directive is eoffiniuxlicated. to the Conunj'ssion.
$ach tert ehaLl be published by the Connissiono
J l,{ember Statee s}reli transmit to the Cornmission the details of the
categorization system which they have ad.opted. nurd shalL irunediately
info:rm the Comrniesion of arry modification made to this system. The
Commiss1on r*ill publioh the details of these categorlzation systems eis
HeLl as aqy amendment nade to thero by Mernbor Statee'
4 Menber States shall submit to the Cornrnission, at the end of each
calendar year, the list of authoriza*ions delivered. durirrg the year a'nd
a genera! report of their experionce ar:d. problens encountered. with ihe
regulation of recombinant 3NA work'
ArticleJ
I Because of the unceasi.n5l progreern of icrnwledge and" technigues in the
field of basic and appl.ied biolory, this D.irective avrd its contitruerl
applicability to pr"oducti.on aotivities of industries shall be throu.ghly
::eviewed, and revised if necessarXr, at regular intervals not exceeding
two years.
Article 6
1 this lirective is addreseed to the Member States.
Done at
For the Council
fhe Presldent
ti
